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The objective of the present research is to propose a debate about the violations perpetrated over credit money due to the rupture of Bretton Woods’s agreements and the emergence of a shadow financial system. These changes distorted credit money as one of the fundamental pillars for stability and development of international economic system, causing the current crisis. Our research is mainly based on the post-keynesian theoretical approach about credit money developed by Parguez (2010), Gnos and Rochon (2004), Secareccia and Parguez (2000), etc. The other theoretical grounds are the analysis made by Tobias and Hyun Song over the shadow financial system and the valuable contributions of Parguez (2010), Guttman (2010), Girón and Chapoy (2009) about financial crisis in Europe, United States and Latin America. 
To accomplish our purpose we have analyzed the following topics:
1)	Credit money and the metamorphosis of the parallel financial system
2)	The insertion of financial circuits to the speculative financial circuit
a)	Latin America and its integration to financial globalization
b)	The deepening of financial and economic reforms
c)	The displacement of capital flows
d)	The crisis of money manager capitalism
3)	Credit money and its role in the recovery 






This paper pretends to incorporate to debate a study of the multiple violations that have been perpetrated over «credit money» since the rupture of Bretton Woods Agreements and the deepening of a «parallel financial system», which is in great extent responsible for the current world crisis. First we present a brief outlook of «credit money» and the metamorphosis of «parallel financial system» as a precedent of economic crisis. Secondly we point out the effect caused by neoliberal policies in financial circuits, emphasizing the case of Latin America, when this region faced the problem of indebtedness throughout the 80’s and their economies kept a monetary sovereignty using it to devaluate their currencies and promote exporting policies. These kinds of adjustments are not possible for European countries because they are constrained to European Central Bank rules. At last we analyze the frequent policies and approaches disposed to confront the deepening of the economic and financial crisis.  

I. «Credit money» and metamorphosis of the «parallel financial system»
«Credit money», as a fundamental pillar for development and stability of international economic system finds itself in a serious crisis. In the phase of efflux, under stable financial conditions, the banking system creates ex nihilo «credit money» or real money as explicit credits with State validation. These credits are the beginning of firm’s countable exercises. This credit money is destroyed throughout the phases of the monetary circuit, especially on times of repayment (reflux). This happens because economic agents pay their debts to other private agents and to State (taxes, services, public goods, etc.) and it reflects on bank’s balance sheets through the destruction of credit money in their assets and liabilities [Parguez and Seccareccia, 2000:104-107]. At the end of the Second World War under Bretton Woods’s agreements and the preeminence of the United States of America a new hierarchy of power relations was born and it was institutionally expressed on the International Monetary System.
The rupture of Breton Woods’s Agreements and the devaluation of dollar against gold during the seventies started credit money crisis. This meant the beginning of a period where the limits established to the general equivalent started to split gradually, setting the basis for the financial consortiums, along with the international financial organisms as the International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Bank (WB) and later on the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to establish the platform for the search of profitability in the financial sphere. Setting aside getting profit from the valorization process, i.e, it moves from production and circulation sphere to financial sphere.
In this stage banks abandon their function as creators of money backed on the State and on the real value anchored to the quantity of labor value newly produced. This breaks the stability of banking system because the monetary circuit, as the ultimate existence condition of capitalist system cannot exist without State intervention [Parguez, 2011: 3-4]. Therefore, in the following years banking participation in the titulization of assets increased causing regional instabilities and gradual ruptures, until it reached global dimensions. Actual wealth is supplanted for fake wealth, credit activity stops to be oriented to the real sphere of economy. Banks resigned to perform their normal role and ignored financial stability rules​[3]​ and are transformed into casinos that do not provide credits for investment and consumption and the financial structure becomes independent from real economy [Parguez, 2009: 67-73 y 2010: 207-214]. 
With this transformation national financial systems where gradually modified so to be integrated into a unique global financial system. This integration erupted during the eighties, after a period of frequent crisis of national currencies, and establishes a dialectic relation between money-capital; industrial capital and bank capital expressed on industrial profit. Once again, as in Hilferding times [1971: 109-139], financial capital strengthens with joint stock enterprises, i.e, the expansion of transnational enterprises in the second half of XXth century up to the acceleration of great fusions and megafusions during the transition to XXIst century. 
The metamorphosis that occurs on financial systems due to Bretton Woods’s monetary system manifests with new participants. Development banking stopped being the main creditor of development financing because the State abandoned long-run economic growth policies and abandoned productive investment. The main consequence was a downturn on the level of employment and wages. Commercial banks operate in the secondary market as investment bank does. Banking and non banking financial investors are reinforced with new ways of providing credits to such an extent that financial innovation took an unusual increase.
This credit boom was accompanied of a negligent regulation of central banks, mainly the Federal Reserve System (Fed) and the State. Even the previous regulating State became into a non regulator and destabilizing organism and instigator of a new model of capitalism with preponderance of financial sector. It was accomplished applying continued shock therapy policies focused to decrease public spending, public deficits and raising taxes. State abandoned the role of driving force for labor value creation to become into a destructive force of the creating value factors, letting happen a sustained unemployment growth.
The subsequent period to the fall of Bretton Woods’s monetary system sets up the basis for the «shadow or parallel financial system» through the process of financiarization and securitization in the context of deregulation and financial liberalization. This process of structural changes in the credit system not only allows structured finances but also strengthens operations out of balance, giving the appearance of infinite liquidity to financial analysts, i.e, it seems hugely profitable to banking and non banking financial intermediaries. 
Tobias and Hyun Song (2009) define the «shadow or parallel financial system» as the financial system created on the grounds of securitizing assets and integrating banking activities in the development of capital markets​[4]​. Deregulation and financial liberalization throughout the eighties opened the gates to securtitization and financiarization in all banking systems and market capitals of almost every country of the world. Financial globalization relies on a financial system backed on official and non official capital markets -over the counter- and on financial circuits internationally integrated.
When the financial circuits stopped being national to become international all banking and non banking investor’s operations took shape in the financial innovation through financial instruments of new creation. Great liquidity is created through securitization; it stimulates spending due to “wealth effect” and distributes risk.
«Shadow or parallel financial system» is understood thanks to securtitization and financiarization. To Girón and Chapoy [2009:44-45] “…the process of financiarization is the purchase and sale of assets or financial securities that can be accomplished in an ordered way in capital markets. Is the process whereby financial capital profitability, through financial innovation… exceeds the regulatory system created through…Bretton Woods organisms (1944). Financial markets imposed over international financial organisms and financing by securities took advantage through mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, insurers and other non institutionalized investors that became the actors of global finances.” 
This «shadow financial system» will articulate all national financial circuits in a unique international financial circuit where actual time is continuous and integrates Asian financial markets with European, American and Latin American financial markets. Stock market indicators will determine daily life in national economies. Rating institutions will be an evaluation mechanism competing indirectly with the IMF when determining the risk and grade of financial instruments resultant form financial innovation. These financial instruments will be the usual derivates and synthetic derivates that allowed the infinite growth of liquidity. 
There is no doubt that the existence of a «parallel financial system» relying on speculation and on the thinking of ‘originate and distribute’ risk will create the groundings of current crisis. But the existence of «shadow financial system» and global financial crisis, in which we are still immersed, are a product of the ensemble of economic policies applied by States according to the dictates of mainstream. Such policies behaved predatorily towards the financial structure that held up actual economy. This [Parguez, 2010:214-216] «butterfly effect» has collapsed world economy foundations, causing households, firms and some State defaults in Europe. 
Due to this process the humungous magnitude of current crisis goes further from that of a crisis in simple monetary economy. In the latter do not occurs a violation to money as abstraction of exchange and to «credit money» in the valorization process of capital. Money in its abstraction, besides being undermined in its principles, has been blurred in its essential role, i.e, its fundamental relation as creator of employment and social welfare.
Financial instability expressed at the beginning as a crisis of subprime mortgages and as it developed exposed the actuality of the «shadow financial system. A system where financial innovation that allowed holdings to get into great debt and also where the securitization and financiarization process of ‘originating and distributing’ risk participated in the speculative fraud to make up a bubble surpassing Minsky’s experience​[5]​. During the mortgage boom in the United States (1996-2006) debt titles home-equity withdrawals​[6]​ contributed to raise GDP’s rate growth after augmenting holdings consumption.




II. Violation of «credit money»: insertion of national financial circuits into the speculative financial circuit
Since the rupture of Bretton Woods’s agreements one of the main goals of international financial organisms was the insertion of national financial circuits to an international financial circuit. The financial globalization process became a priority in stabilization programs of IMF and WB. This Process was established by mainstream economics as a complement of the necessary liberalization of capital flows to underdeveloped countries. That way those flows would have «collateral effects» over the less developed countries and improve substantially their economic development. For that reason, crisis of the seventies and problems generated by external debt were the foundation of financial reforms of the process of liberalization in Latin America and Asia in the nineties. Banking crisis of the nineties were a consequence of financial reforms consisting on deregulation and financial liberalization. It was believed that the flow of capital investments would help to economic development of those countries​[7]​. The result was not multiplying development dynamics but the increase of profits for banking and non banking transnational conglomerates.
a) Latin America and its insertion to financial globalization
Frequent crisis along with the acceleration of the process of securitization and financiarization in Latin America is the result of those economic guidelines. Latin American financial system metamorphosis since the seventies has internationalized almost every banking system and it also has foreignized it almost entirely. Every country is part of the financial globalization. IMF and international financial organisms accompanied by the rating agencies did theirs the process of evaluation, not only of the «parallel financial system» but also of public deficit and sovereign debt of the State. In the process of liberalization municipal debts are very important to institutional investors, who appropriate their financing to make speculative investments. 
Reviewing the transference of wealth from the receiving countries to the owners of capital is part of a story that seems endless in Latin America. Devaluations of their national currencies against the hegemonic currency, liquidity problems to face the payment for the service of foreign debt, banking crisis and its repercussions over the volatility of commodity prices are a frequent financial scenario in Latin America.
b) Deepening of economic and financial reforms
The obsession for economic and financial reforms designed for the opening of financial systems, accomplishing more efficiency and competitiveness throughout the eighties was the step to internationalize financial circuits. Mc Kinnon (1973), Gurley and Shaw (1973) accompanied by the monetarist thought of Chicago Boys influenced Latin-American governments. When the ideological confrontation came few academic groups were influenced by Minsky’s ideas (1982), Díaz-Alejandro (1995) and other authors that carry out important theoretical contributions and debated against those development policies, deregulation and financial liberalization, and the opening of financial systems. 
The growth in the countries where the financial reforms deepened is lower than in those where the internationalization of financial systems was not accomplished. For example, for Mexico, Argentina and Brazil the degree of internationalization reaches 73%, 35% y 13% respectively, so the rates of GDP growth of the first decade of this century are asymmetric curves as it is seen in the following graph.


The buying banks that predominate in the acquisition of Latin-American banks were the Spanish BBVA​[8]​ and Santander, and the American Citigroup and Bank of America. “By chance” the biggest profits (out of Iberian Peninsula), shown in their financial reports, come from Mexico –see graph 2. And American banks do not sell their banks in Latin America despite the financial disorder that suffered in the course of crisis.
It is important to add that the concentration process in Latin America deepened through privatizations with a growth rate of 51.5% between 1996 and 2000. The privatization processes of financial and non financial enterprises were characterized in a first stage for the sale of public enterprises to the national private sector and subsequently occurred multiple fusions and megafusions between those national firms, lastly most of them where acquired by foreign capital. 


c) Displacements of capital flows
In the eighties Latin America received flows of foreign investment by the sum of 7,485 millions of dollars and Asia only 516 millions of dollars. Total foreign investment was 8,392 millions of dollars in underdeveloped countries for those years. As a consequence of profitability differentials and a bigger internationalization of capital since the nineties we have observed a displacement of direct foreign investments from Latin America to other emerging economies​[9]​ like we see in China​[10]​, India and East Europe. The 80% of firms included on the 500’s list of Fortune invested on China and only 33% channeled resources to Latin America in this decade.
The previous data confirms that financial opening did not lead to the expected results on Latin America. Asia and Latin America suffered financial crisis in the nineties but development policies, reforms and opening to financial systems were different in both regions (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998). While in Asia financial systems resulted strengthened with the crisis, in Latin America were foreignized during nineties.
During the nineties financial investors were interested in emerging markets, their growth and modernization attracted specialized investment funds. Commercial flows between emerging countries increased in detriment of commerce they had with developed countries. In this countries appeared the sovereign funds that proliferated at the beginning of the XXIst century and have saved European and American financial institutions: UBS, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Citigroup.
Nevertheless world financial crisis weakened external financing to Indian firms and severe net withdrawals happened (portfolio investments and remittances of workers). The implementation of reactivation policies in China and India prevented that their declining growing rates 2007-2009 caused a recession. 

d) Europe in the global crisis
In the seventies, facing the international monetary system collapse Europe strengthen its integration as European Union imposing restrictions to economic and social policies of its members in order to create the Perfect Model of General Equilibrium [European Model] with perfect competition in that area. According to Parguez [2008] this straitjacket besides being result of the UE spirit was a consequence of the creation of the Euro System imposed by Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties. 
The implementation of the Perfect Model of General Equilibrium in the Euro System [Gold Zone 1931] required the Sovereign ECB – supranational institution independent to any political power – with a main objective: zero inflation. This goal pressed interest rates to increase and endorsed a high unemployment worsened by the permanent application of the Stability and Growth Agreement that established a 3% GDP limit to public deficit and 60% to public debt. Under this orthodox orientation ECB installed a unique supranational currency that abolished national monetary sovereignty. Monetary and public spending severity depressed productive investment and aggregate effective demand. These circumstances caused: 1) households super-indebtedness when they tried to avoid a fall in their consumption level, 2) distorted the fundamental principles of modern economy when it avoided the creation of credit money by banks, which implied a restriction to the spending of creators of actual wealth (firms, households and the State), therefore caused an increasing financial instability [Bliek and Parguez, 2007] that remains until now. 
It is forbidden for central banks of each member country to finance governmental administration and public enterprises, only commercial banks are allowed to do it. Therefore States – spendthrifts and out of order – in order to finance themselves have to turn to efficient creditors in financial markets. In the presence of this linked restrictions to the economical activity of the State [Bliek and Parguez, 2006: 98-102] European governments try to reactivate their economies and overcome the financial problems generated by the subprime crisis attempted to compensate the private debt explosion helping banks. But the extent of reactivation plans became a rise in the sovereign debt causing that the relation public debt/GDP reached high levels. 
Doubts regarding the viability of such policies in the medium and long term increased between international financiers. Public debts reached 95% of the GDP in the euro zone and 80% in the United Kingdom. Once the risk has been transferred from the private sector to the State, Greek, Irish, Spanish and Portuguese economies plunged in a deep crisis. In 2010 fiscal deficit in Greece reached in April 13.6%, Spain’s 11.1% and Portugal’s 7.3% at the end of the year.
The crisis in Europe has shown failures in the euro zone organization: the countries that conforms it cannot be financed by the European central bank, they depend entirely of the market to finance their deficits. Therefore, European central bank does not have the capacity to prevent the default of states and is not able to detect on time macroeconomic problems that object the viability of euro. For this reasons, fearing the spreading to capital market all over the world and being pressured by the IMF, governments in the euro zone ended accepting IMF intervention with 250 thousand million euros and the ECB accepted to buy state liabilities in order to mitigate financial nerves.
European Union looking for the reduction of public deficits beneath 3% has decided to apply and orthodox strategy to overcome the crisis: reducing quickly the level of debt beneath 60% of GDP and compromising with restrictive policies, try to increase the saving rate of holdings. Europe administrates austerity programs similar to the ones followed by Latin America during the eighties. Now European Union leads its population to an economic retreat​[11]​. 
Applying the austerity policies used in Latin America during the eighties and nineties means imposing to population abstinence measures, privatization of the best public services, a permanent pressure to make more flexible market job, keep considering the State as a parasite and raising indexes of poverty. According to the ECLAC [2010] the possible negative effects of fiscal adjustment in the European economic reactivation depend on how the paths of actual sector and financial sector are well-spent, even if Latin America could be seriously affected. European demand for Latin American exportations will decrease due to the imposed austerity, to the difference in the exchange rate between us dollar and euro and the difference between interest rates in the European Economic Activity and the United States. Also competition will increase in the markets were both regions participate. As well, European crisis damages financial flows to Latin America: fewer remittances from Latin American immigrants, a fall of direct foreign investment and stock-market investment and a drop in the revenues by tourism. Of course European crisis will not affect in the same magnitude all the Latin American countries; this depends on the relation kept between the two parts, which globally means delays recovery.  

e) To understand the crisis of money manager capitalism
One of the theoretical concepts to understand the origin of crisis is money manager capitalism. Wray [2009: 5-10] mentions that in Minsky’s words this concept characterizes how institutional investors, in order to ensure maximum return rates, work over an extreme degree of leverage of their assets, systematically the risk is very high. Banks creators of the «shadow or parallel financial system» packed mortgages and issued debt titles over those loans. That is the way how they quickly obtained the return of loaned funds to lend again. The deepening and credit risk were constantly bigger in accordance to credits granted to clients not classified by banks (excluded of credit access).
Moreover, United States and Europe financial investors created new financial instruments. These titles (packages backed on mortgages or other assets with collateralized debt) were classified according to their risk level: a) High risk, out of sheet balances are known as structured investment vehicles (SIV) or hedge funds, and b) Low risk, liabilities of collateralized debt (CDOs), interests securitized in asset funds.
Since the eighties, financial internationalization along with the process of globalization, financial deregulation and financial liberalization inserted every single country in a parallel financial system out of regulation of any central bank. Even though market values have shown an improvement in their indicators the crisis started on 2007 continues. Economic growth in emerging countries like China, India and Brazil questions its continuity as so does the uncouple thesis for South American countries. The development of crisis brings new surprises every day. Five or ten years ago hardly one economist could have imagined a crisis like the one we live now. 
Taking up again Wray thesis [2010:5-10] about the concept developed by Minsky money manager capitalism is also important to mention that central bank and the State have been responsible for guaranteeing profitability to conglomerates and for making possible the track of crisis. Central bank manipulates interest rates and therefore marginal efficiency of capital to dispose profitability for financier conglomerates. The State expresses the interests of the hegemonic class and manages the process of capital accumulation coordinately.

III. «Credit money» and its role overcoming the crisis 
Up to this moment «credit money» has not performed its main function in the process of overcoming the crisis. Instability and fragility of global economy appeared as a shadow over the incipient economic recovery supposedly initiated on March 2009. Since the first months of 2010 fragility and instability were evident, due to the default of public debts in some countries of euro zone. 
The alternatives presented to overcome the crisis are not able to generate employment and reactivate effective demand, quite the contrary. Economic policies applied focus on “rational expectations” of “market discipline” as James Gailbraith (2010) comments. This “market efficiency hypothesis” is the reason for many economists to state that speculation, in certain moment, could stabilize prices; protect seller’s reputation and dispelling speculation avoids frauds. Not all economists believe these assumptions, but many do [Galbraith, 2010]. 
In the last decades frequent crisis development, both in developed countries as in underdeveloped ones, has followed a pattern established by IMF and financial agents. Financial crisis appears accompanied by sovereign debt crisis and to overcome it is indispensable to guarantee financial agents profitability. 
The fear to a moratorium gets creditors in check and the panic for assets withdrawal in the banking system generates a devaluation of the currency regarding the general equivalent. The State enters as the last resort moneylender to save financial and no financial agents’ debt. It raises fiscal deficit and in order to achieve equilibrium reduces public investment, conducting economy to pay to its creditors. To accomplish this rearrangement requires the participation of al international financial organisms and the central bank to guarantee the profitability of debts contracted with the exterior. 
When Reinhart (2009) analyzes recent crisis in emerging countries explains that governments expand external debt, accumulating harmful debt, because whenever they seem incapable to cover this service, due to exchange rates; interest rates or downturn of prices of their main commodities on international market. In face of a moratorium creditors panic and asset withdrawals of the banking system cause an asset bank withdrawal that culminates on their currency devaluation. State works as lender of last resort to save financial and no financial agents debts. This way, fiscal deficit grows and in order to attain its equilibrium reduces public spending, guiding all the economy towards payments to creditors. To achieve this goal, every international financial organism along with the central bank has to participate guaranteeing foreign credit’s profitability.
The origin of financial crisis in emerging countries throughout the nineties is Bretton Woods’s financial system rupture and birth of the «parallel financial system» at the beginning of the seventies. Inequity on wages and its deterioration have prevented that the majority of population take advantage of high productivity, technological advance and world production. Valorization cycle and realization of profits on circulation were not obtained, so financial innovation and speculation created virtual profits through an unimaginable credit expansion.  
In the eighties part of the most important productive sector moved from the United States to China because the latter made economic reforms as part of a new strategy to insert in the global market.   This fact is very important, because the productive sector was attracted by a cheaper labor force which reduced commodity prices not only to the biggest consumer in the world but to the rest of countries. The great transformations on the emerging economies show a more optimistic face to crisis. But the question is ¿until when crisis course is able to sustain high rates of growth of their exports and of their GDP? 
Today, crisis metamorphosis is pulling down neoclassical precepts. European monetary union is just an example of an unsustainable fragility. Crisis has not only affected financial circuits but also productive circuits, and therefore valorizing capital circuits. Crisis in European Union and euro provide great lessons. It allows us to observe how the ECB an independent entity that behaves as a supranational organism that determines rate interests looking to adjust aggregate demand to compatible levels of general equilibrium (in Wicksellian sense) as not be deviated of prices stability (inflation control) compromise monetary sovereignty of countries and not allow to minor economies, as Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain (PIGS) to grow​[12]​. 
Sovereign debts in hand of hedge funds have leaded governments of these countries (PIGS) to repress demand of their populations in order to reduce fiscal deficit. Mallaby explains correctly these hedge funds history as “…the history of hedge funds is the history of finances frontiers: innovation and increasing leverage, the triumphs of speculation and the humiliating downturns and the nascent history of debates about these dramas [Mallaby, 2010: 5]. 
On the other side Germany and France have been favored with the euro they have took advantage of its high productivity. On the background the European Central Bank as has not carried out as lender of last resort, but each country since 2007 has faced banks bankruptcies by their own providing liquidity via loans or via nationalization of great banks. 
Nor Basilea III, nor a Financial Reform of the United States, nor more attempts of financial reforms will save those countries of being in crisis. The giant speculation still sums great quantities on the international financial market of those «toxic instruments». At the end of 2010 still was fuzzy the restoration of labor markets at global level, despite the financial packages applied by European countries and the United States. Even the outstanding profit registered on the global stock markets​[13]​ the future of economy remained fragile and instable. 

IV. Final Considerations
Overcoming crisis is not the improvement of stock market indicators but dismantling all those policies that destroyed the basic conditions for financial stability, carrying out institutional reforms that fight inequality and applying policies that improve income distribution, decrease unemployment rates and focusing on full employment. It is appropriate to consider Gnos and Rochon proposals [2004: 613-629], which consider addressing the root causes the best way to face the disorder left by the international monetary and financial system crisis.
A stable banking system requires a stable long term growth of public debts to which private debts should adjust. This has to be complemented of fiscal and monetary long term policies with interest rates sufficiently low and stable to avoid banks advantages that do not materialize on productive spends. 
It is necessary to protect external sector. State always has to spend on his own currency and public investment generated through planned deficits must allow a sustainable commercial deficit on the long term. In a well managed economy an external restriction cannot exist.
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These three rules are intertwined and define the normal role of a banker. The latter must never make an effort to transfer the decision he has made for the future to other intermediary out of money creation. Money creation does not leads to value creation, indeed it means absence of value, therefore is not actual money. Rules 1 to 3 define the normal role of the State who through its net spending reflects a planned growth of its investment; therefore it must provide banks with enough liquidity and profits to accomplish stability. 
It is easy to generalize the normal role of banks in an open economy. Two new rules of stability are required.
Rule 4. - A bank must only lend for agent’s spending in local money If not it looks obliged to ask for foreign money to foreign banks in other countries.  Rule 5. - The State must only spend in its own currency to be free of any restriction. Ii is the existence condition of the automatic credit privilege, which means that the State is not obliged to change its own currency for foreign currency at a fixed price. Accumulated surpluses by foreign in domestic currency, result of net exports or financial acquisitions, can always be exchanged for their own currency (or other) without importing the quantity and price. This explains why fixed exchange rates are not sustainable, they destroy the anchoring role performed by the State. 
^4	  Tobias and Hyun say: … This take-off the securities sector can be explained by changing structure of the US financial system, and in particular by the changing nature of the residential mortgage market and the growing importance of securitization. Until the early 1980s, banks were the dominant holders of home mortgages, but bank-based holdings were overtaken by market-based holders. Tobias, Adrian y Hyun Song, Shin, “Le système bancaire parallèle: implications pour la régulation financière”, en Banque de France, núm. 13, Francia, Banque de France, 2009. www.banque-france.fr/fr/publications/.../etude01_rsf_0909.pdf, p.3.
^5	  In Minsky’s papers: Can “It” Happen Again? y Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, spoke about what would happen after a continued worsening of credit…there would be a moment in which liquidity will evaporate. 
^6	  Loans backed on building properties, obtaining new credits for refinancing old mortgages and/or a second mortgage. 
^7	  We also need to remember that in macroeconomic terms, countries are able to maintain a relatively stability in the balance of payments because deficits in the current account can be counteracted by surplus in the capital account. That way capital flows seem to be a great support to reach a better development through a bigger entrance of imported goods. 
^8	  The president of BBVA, Francisco González, considers that Spain will contribute to their results less than 10% of the benefits in the next five years (2010-2015), being of 30% before. For this reason the financial conglomerate will look to cover this hole with profits coming from their subsidiaries in Latin America and Asia.http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/BBVA/preve/Espana/aporte/beneficios/anos/elpepueco/20101102elpepueco_1/Tes
^9	  The term “emerging countries” is heterogeneous it includes countries with vigorous economic growth but without strength in their banking system and in the current account of the balance of payments. Some of these countries are producers of raw materials and base products, as Brazil and Russia. Other focuses their development in manufacture production as China. And some others, like India have specialized on services. Another criterion to catalogue emerging economies are growing rates of GDP, demographic situation, access to certain international products, imports and exports, appearance of multinationals –Brazil, Mexico, India, China and South Africa – the role of State as facilitator for development, investment and research and development (Guillén Romo, 2010: 8-10). 
^10	  China with its fast growth buys en masse commodities to African economies, Latin America and other regions causing an increase in prices. Likewise contributes to keep a moderate inflation in western countries due to the low prices of their products for exportation. Nevertheless, negative effects of China’s growth are the losses of industrial employments in emerging and developed countries.
^11	  Sterdyniak Henri, « “L’endettement des Etats et des particuliers: une menace pour la stabilité de l’économie? »  Cahiers Français núm.357. Juillet-Août, 2010.
^12	  Only in Spain great banks and saving banks in one year (from September 2009 to September 2010) have resort to removed from the Bank of Spain 51.73% (6,059.93 millions of euros) of their reserves to face their obligations.http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/gran/banca/consume/mitad/colchon/anticrisis/ano/elpepueco/20101101elpepieco_7/Tes
^13	  The improvement on stock market indicators had been surprising throughout 2010. The Dow Jones industrial average finished with an 11%, futures market of gold have had an increase of 28%, oil 13%, the future price of cotton and 89%, treasury bonds to 10 years an 8%. Wall Street Journal http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703909904576052061157839804.html?mod=WSJ_Markets_LEFTTopStories
